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Abstract

This article assesses three basic approaches to assessing the future effects of the
government’s fiscal policies: traditional measures of the deficit, measures associated with Generational Accounting, and measures derived from applying Capital
Budgeting to the federal accounts. I conclude that Capital Budgeting is the best
of the three approaches and that Generational Accounting is the least helpful.
Acknowledging that there might be some value in learning what we can from a
variety of approaches to analyzing fiscal policy, I nevertheless conclude that Generational Accounting is actually a misleading or–at best–empty measure of future
fiscal developments. The best approach to providing for the future is thus to apply careful cost-benefit analysis through old-fashioned Capital Budgeting to our
spending and taxing decisions; but if political pressures prevent the adoption of a
federal capital budget, we would be best served by continuing to use our current
deficit measures, with some minor adjustments. Because we are attempting to
peer into the future, any measure of the effects of fiscal policy will be imperfect.
Choosing among those imperfect alternatives is the focus of this essay.
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Introduction
The decisions thatwe make today regarding taxes and government spending have
profound effects not only on those of us living today, but on future generations as well.
These effects arise for two reasons. First, our current taxing and spending decisions help
to determine how the economy’s productive resources will be used now and in the
future—whether, for example, a piece of land becomes the site for a casino, a day care
center, or a cancer research institute. Second, the laws thatwe pass generally commit the
government to courses of action that can last well into the future. While it is surely true
that some laws that claim to set policy for years in advance do not really do so (such as
tax policies passed in 2001 that purport to expire in 2010), others surely represent
commitments from which the government would have some difficulty withdrawing.
These effects of taxing and spending policies—on the current uses of productive
resources, as well as on the somewhat-credible commitments to future policies that they
frequently represent—ought to be of concern to anyone whose time horizon extends past
the current fiscal year. For those who care about the state of the world that we leave to
future generations, the challenge is to find an analytical framework with which to predict
the impact of current policy choices on future standards of living. Typically, these
analytical frameworks are found in macroeconomic analysis of fiscal policy.
Macroeconomics does not, however, figure prominently in legal analysis. While
the legal literature that relies on microeconomics has mushroomed over the last two
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decades or so, macroeconomics has largely remained in the background. With the
occasional exception,1 legal scholars have tended not to include in their analyses the
aggregate economy within which microeconomic efficiency analysis operates. Certainly,
some very good work has been done analyzing proposed constitutional amendments to
constrain government spending or to limit tax increases; but these tend to be selfcontained analyses—and they need not challenge the orthodox view that annual budget
balancing is the essence of fiscal probity.2
In public policy debates, of course, most analysts will acknowledge that some
solutions are not “realistic” because they are too expensive. But what does it mean to be
too expensive? That question, which lies at the heart of fiscal macroeconomics, is
considerably more complex than it might first appear. Some items with very large price
tags are not considered to be too expensive under certain circumstances. For some
parents, a tuition bill exceeding $30,000 a year—while a source of frustration, to be
sure—is not too expensive to send their bundle of joy to a high quality college or
university.
When discussing public spending, however, the notion of “too expensive” can
often take on a simple-minded tone. If it “increases the deficit,” it is often thought to be
per se too expensive. Since every government program, by definition, increases the
deficit above where it would otherwise be, only literally self-financing programs can pass
muster under such a barren decision-makingregime. For legal analysts, therefore, any

1

Mark R. Kelman, Can Lawyers Save the Economy? Stan. L. Rev., 1993 (surveying recent
macroeconomic literature, noting that many current models blame poor macroeconomic performance on
incomplete contracting, and suggesting that lawyers can help to solve such problems)
2
See, for example, Nancy C. Staudt, Constitutional Politics and Balanced Budgets, 1998 U. Ill. L.
Rev. 1105 (1998) (arguing that it is important to balance the budget, but a constitutional amendment is
unnecessary because the budget balancers have won the political debate).
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discussion of proposed changes in policies would have to proceed either from an agnostic
fiscal viewpoint—“Whether this policy would still be desirable, after taking the deficit
into account, is beyond the scope of this analysis”—or must explicitly make the claim
that the proponent’s policy is “not too expensive.”
The latter argument appeared to become somewhat easier to make when federal
deficits turned into surpluses in the late 1990s, and again when the aftermath of
September 11, 2001 seemed to suspend all previous rules on spending.3 The basic
arguments against deficit spending are unlikely ever to go away, though, because of the
widely held belief that fiscal responsibility is synonymous with annually balanced
budgets (or, more extremely, with zero public debt). Indeed, even in the face of a
weakening economy and the threat of a double-dip recession, President George W. Bush
decided to show his economic seriousness during his August 2002 economic summit in
Waco, Texas by announcing that he would refuse to spend $5.1 billion that Congress had
already approved for domestic security and the military.4 Explaining that decision, he
declared: “More money spent in Washington means less money in the hands of American
families and entrepreneurs, less money in the hands of risk takers and job creators.”5
Responding to the political focus on annual cash-flow deficits (and their many
variations), in the early 1990’s the economist Laurence Kotlikoff and his frequent coauthors Alan J. Auerbach and Jagadeesh Gokhale developed a theory that was motivated

3

See, for example, Richard W. Stevenson, Budget Deficit Is Said to Be $159 Billion, N.Y.Times,
October 25, 2002, at A27 (“The return to red ink brought an end to the four-year period in which surpluses
and the promise of more had left both parties almost giddy with the possibility of addressing the nation’s
needs without painful tradeoffs.”)
4
Note that $5.1 billion is approximately one-fourth of one percent of the overall federal budget and
less than 0.05% of annual U.S. GDP.
5
Carle Hulse, Citing Economy, Bush Won’t Spend $5.1 Billion Approve for Security and Other
Uses, N.Y.Times, August 15, 2002, at A15.
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by understandable concerns about the long-term effects of federal fiscal commitments.
Dubbed Generational Accounting,6 the resulting model—whatever its merits and
shortcomings (discussed in some detail below)—would put an even greater constraint on
legal analysts or anyone else who might propose a change in public policy. No longer
would it be enough to prove that a policy would not increase the current deficit; Kotlikoff
et al. would offer opponents of government activism an even more powerful trump card.
Generational Accounting (hereinafter GA) requires not merely that there be enough
money to pay for the program today, but it also requires that the program be “affordable”
into the indefinite future, as measured by long-range budget forecasts. Adding a political
(and somewhat emotional) slant to the discussion, GA’s proponents further suggest that
anything that is not affordable in this way is a transfer to the (voting) living generations
from (politically defenseless) unborn generations.
The basic notion behind generational accounting is quite simple—though such
conceptual simplicity makes the intractable measurement problems discussed below all
the more frustrating. If current spending and tax laws were to stay in effect in perpetuity,
the flows of expenditures and revenues would vary depending on future economic
growth, population changes, weather patterns, medical developments, etc. GA makes
some very basic assumptions about the directions and magnitudes of the most important

6

See Alan J., Auerbach, Jagadeesh Gokhale, and Laurence J. Kotlikoff. Generational Accounts: A
Meaningful Alternative to Deficit Accounting, 5 Tax Pol’y & Econ. 55 (David Bradford ed., 1991);
Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Generational Accounting: Knowing Who Pays, and When, for What We Spend
(1992); Lawrence Kotlikoff, From Deficit Delusion to Generational Accounting, Harv. Bus. Rev., MayJune 1993, at 104-05; Alan J. Auerbach, Jagadeesh Gokhale, and Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Generational
Accounting: A Meaningful Way to Evaluate Fiscal Policy, 8 J. of Econ. Perspectives 73 (1994); Laurence J.
Kotlikoff, Reply to Diamond’s and Cutler’s reviews of generational accounting, 50 National Tax Journal
303 (1997); Alan J. Auerbach, Laurence J. Kotlikoff, and Willi Leibfritz, eds., Generational Accounting
Around the World (1998); Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Generational Policy, National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper 8163, March 2001, forthcoming in Handbook of Public Economics (2nd Ed.).
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of those future trends, applies the accounting concept of net present value to bring all of
those projected future expenditures and revenues into current dollar terms, and then
computes the different lifetime net tax rates implied by those calculations for different
generations. Hence, Kotlikoff and his co-authors claim that GA measures whether
current generations are being “fair” to those that will follow.
Tax Notes—the periodical of record for tax practitioners, policymakers, and
academics—has carried at least eight articles that in some way deal with GA since 1991,
when the theory was first introduced.7 To date, the appearances of GA in the legal
literature has not been extensive,8 but this may be changing. Professor Daniel Shaviro of

7

Alan D. Viard, The Social Security Surplus, the Trust Fund, and the Federal Budget, 94 Tax Notes
891 (2002); Sheldon D. Pollack, Professor Supports 'PAYGO' To Restrain Worst Impulses Of Both Parties,
82 Tax Notes 1035 (1999); Daniel Shaviro, Understanding the Generational Challenge, 75 Tax Notes 714
(1997); Karen C. Burke, VATs and Flat Taxes Reconsidered, 70 Tax Notes 899 (1996); Richard Goode &
C. Eugene Steuerle, Generational Accounts and Fiscal Policy, 65 Tax Notes 1027 (1994); Barbara
Kirchheimer, Generational Accounting: Are We Soaking the Young? 62 Tax Notes 945 (1994); David M.
Cutler, Generational Accounting: Knowing Who Pays, and When, for What We Spend, 60 Tax Notes 361
(1993); J. Andrew Hoerner, NBER Conferees Discuss IRAs, Integration, Corporate Tax Shifts, 53 Tax
Notes 878 (1991).
8
A Lexis search of all law reviews turned up eighteen citations to “generational accounting,”
starting in 1993: Axel P. Gosseries, Symposium: Intergenerational Equity: What Do We Owe the Next
Generations? 35 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 293 (2001); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition,
and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1573 (2000); Alan Newman, Incorporating
the Partnership Theory of Marriage Into Elective-Share Law: The Approximation System of the Uniform
Probate Code and the Deferred-Community-Property Alternative, 49 Emory L.J. 487 (2000); Mary L.
Heen, Reinventing Tax Expenditure Reform: Improving Program Oversight Under The Government
Performance And Results Act, 35 Wake Forest L. Rev. 751, (2000); Maria O'Brien Hylton, Evaluating the
Case for Social Security Reform: Elderly Poverty, Paternalism and Private Pensions, 64 Brooklyn L. Rev.
749 (1998); Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the Tax
Legislative Process, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 501 (1998); Evelyn Brody, Charitable Endowments and the
Democratization of Dynasty, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 873 (1997); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rise of Rhetoric in
Tax Reform Debate: An Example, 70 Tul. L. Rev. 2345 (1996); Peter Diamond, Generational Accounts and
Generational Balance: An Assessment, 49 National Tax Journal 597 (1996); Michael J. Graetz, Paint-ByNumbers Tax Lawmaking, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 609 (1995); Joseph M. Dodge, A Combined Mark-to-Market
and Pass-Through Corporate-Shareholder Integration, 50 Tax L. Rev. 265 (1995); Jonathan Barry Forman,
Reconsidering the Income Tax Treatment of the Elderly: It's Time for the Elderly to Pay Their Fair Share,
56 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 589 (1995)( Reprinted in 69 Tax Notes 485); Jane Maslow Cohen, Competitive and
Cooperative Dependencies: The Case for Children, 81 Va. L. Rev. 2217 (1995); Katherine Pratt, Funding
Health Care with an Employer Mandate: Efficiency and Equity Concerns, 39 St. Louis L.J. 155 (1994);
Edward J. McCaffery, The UCLA Tax Policy Conference: Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. Rev.
1861 (1994); Evelyn Brody, Paying Back Your Country through Income-Contingent Student Loans, 31 San
Diego L. Rev. 449 (1994); Edith Brown Weiss, Environmentally Sustainable Competitiveness: A Comment,
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New York University Law School has written, in addition to a short article in Tax Notes,9
two books10 (and has finished a third11) that to some degree would import GA into legal
analyses of Social Security policy and Medicare policy—and possibly into alllegal
analysis of fiscal policy. Suggesting a long-term fiscal imbalance that makes “the current
policy fiscally unsustainable,”12 Shaviro asserts that it is necessary to think about these
issues through the lens of GA13—and such an analysis, we learn, shows a grim future
indeed, as described below.
The stakes in this debate, therefore, could hardly be higher. Anyone who wishes
to write about Medicare or Social Security, and indeed anyone who might ever wish to
suggest that the government should spend money on any project, might plausibly be
forced to contend with the implications of GA.
If GA lived up to its billing, of course, it would simply be good policy to use it as
a starting point for fiscal analysis. Unfortunately, GA is not a neutral analytical tool that
is used dispassionately to assess the fiscal consequences of a government project.
Instead, GA is based on highly contestable assumptions, arbitrary analytical choices, and
manipulable policy projections that fatally compromise its analytical value.

102 Yale L.J. 2123 (1993); David Cutler, Review of Generational Accounting: Knowing Who Pays, and
When, for What We Spend, 46 National Tax Journal 61(1993).
While some of these references are merely pro forma (e.g., McCaffery, Garrett, Newman), and
Kornhauser directly criticizes the theory, several of the articles (esp. Brody’s pieces and Forman’s article)
actively endorse GA.
9
Supra note 7.
10
Daniel Shaviro, Making Sense of Social Security Reform (2000); Daniel Shaviro, Do Deficits
Matter? (1997)
11
Daniel Shaviro, Who Should Pay for Medicare? (forthcoming)
12
Shaviro, supra note 7, at 715.
13
Id. at 716 (“Perhaps the best tool for enhancing our understanding of who wins and loses from
alternative reforms is generational accounting….”) Shaviro is not, however, explicitly wedded to GA to
the exclusion of all else. Instead, he has suggested that we should use GA as well as other theories to learn
as much as we can from a variety of approaches.
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Understanding these limitations is essential for anyone who wishes to be able to respond
to the suggestion that their favored policy is, in this much broader sense, “too expensive.”
The debate, therefore, is not over whether the future matters—that is, this is not a
debate between the grasshoppers and the ants. Clearly, we must always think carefully
about the future consequences of our fiscal policies. The question is how to think about
the future—what we would like to bequeath to future generations and how best to deliver
it.
This article assesses three basic approaches to assessing the future effects of the
government’s fiscal policies: traditional measures of the deficit, measures associated with
Generational Accounting, and measures derived from applying Capital Budgeting to the
federal accounts. I concludethat Capital Budgeting is the best of the three approaches
and that Generational Accounting is the least helpful. Acknowledging that there might be
some value in learning what we can from a variety of approaches to analyzing fiscal
policy, I nevertheless conclude that Generational Accounting is actually a misleading
or—at best—empty measure of future fiscal developments. The best approach to
providing for the future is thus to apply careful cost-benefit analysis through oldfashioned Capital Budgeting to our spending and taxing decisions; but if political
pressures prevent the adoption of a federal capital budget, we would be best served by
continuing to use our current deficit measures, with some minor adjustments.
Because we are attempting to peer into the future, any measure of the effects of
fiscal policy will be imperfect. Choosing among those imperfect alternatives is the focus
of this essay.
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I.

Traditional Fiscal Deficit Measures
Even the most casual observer of U.S. political debates cannot have missed the

fact that our politicians are obsessed with “the deficit.” After decades in which
Republicans regularly attacked Democrats for their spendthrift ways, Democrats
delighted in turning the tables in the 1980s, as Ronald Reagan presided over the largest
nominal peacetime deficits in American history. Undaunted, conservative Republicans
insisted that they were the truly responsible fiscal custodians, culminating in the promise
to balance the budget in 1994’s Contract With America.
Capitulating to the political heat generated by this headline-grabbing issue, former
President Clinton agreed in 1995 that he, too, was committed to balancing the budget.14
When the budget moved from deficit, to balance, and then to surplus under his watch,
Clinton never missed an opportunity to take credit for this “achievement.” With their
own party’s leadership having abandoned them, even the most progressive members of
the Democratic Party became committed budget balancers. Senator Russell Feingold, for
example, eagerly points out that he opposed President Clinton’s proposed middle-class
tax cut in the early 1990’s. “I was for deficit reduction.”15
The politics of fiscal deficits can, therefore, change rapidly. In an early draft of
this article, written in the late autumn of 2002, it was plausible to argue: “Officially,

14

Indeed, Clinton’s pre-1994 actions showed that he was strongly predisposed to the balancedbudget mantra, as he immediately jettisoned his post-election plans for long-term capital spending and
instead pushed through a major tax increase. (For those who approve of tax progressivity, however, one
can at least note that Clinton’s tax bill was top-loaded.)
15
Matthew Rothschild, The Progressive Interview: Russ Feingold, The Progressive, May 2002, at
31. Feingold’s reasoning is, at best, puzzling: “I think it’s a mistake from the point of view of our economy
and also as far as gaining credibility with the American people if we don’t try to avoid deficits. Whatever
organization you are with, whether it’s an environmental group, right-to-life group, Communist Party, you
all are going to have to pay the bills. You establish credibility with people when you show them that
whatever your ideology you will take care of their dollars in a businesslike way.” Id. Feingold thus
confuses (among other things) government budgeting with personal budgeting.
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therefore, there are no longer any major political voices in American politics that argue in
favor of deficit spending.16”17 At that point, as the fiscal ink turned red again, a new
consensus arose that the return to short-run deficits was not a serious problem—but that
long term deficits represent a virtual “cancer” eating away at future prosperity.18 With
the onset of the 2004 presidential campaign, of course, finger-pointing about the deficit
has risen to a fevered pitch.
To some degree, this political obsession with annual deficits is quite surprising,
because the economic arguments in favor of deficit spending in various circumstances are
well known and, to a large extent, uncontroversial. While it is certainly possible to argue
that, in spite of the economic case in favor of deficits in some circumstances, there is a
stronger political case against them,19 it is at least worth remembering what the economic
issues are.
A. Preliminary Matters
Economists differentiate between two types of variables: stock variables and flow
variables. The difference between the two has to do with the passage of time. Stock
variables can be measured at a moment in time, while flow variables are only meaningful

16
Those who do oppose the orthodoxy are not necessarily at the liberal end of the spectrum. Former
Congressman Jack Kemp was once the most prominent political advocate of so-called Supply Side
Economics, which holds that low tax rates are much more important than balanced budgets in generating
high economic growth rates. [cite]
17
Neil H. Buchanan, Providing for Future Generations: Generational Accounting, Capital
Budgeting, and Budget Deficits, unpublished manuscript (on file with author), November 25, 2002, at 8
(footnote in original). Compare also Prof. Staudt’s conclusion in 1998 that budget balancers had prevailed
in the political debate. See note 2, supra.
18
See, for example, Suddenly, Deficits Are No Big Deal, The New York Times, Nov. 18, 2002, at C1
(quoting Kotlikoff). See also David Leonhardt, That Big Fat Budget Deficit. Yawn. The New York Times,
Feb. 8, 2004, Sec. 3, at 1
19
Alan S. Blinder, Is the National Debt Really—I Mean, Really—a Burden? in James S. Rock, ed.,
Debt and the Twin Deficits Debate, 1991, at 209-25 (arguing that, even though the deficits of the 1980’s
and early 1990’s were relatively minor, there could be no political peace unless everyone agreed to balance
the budget).
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per unit of time. Thus, distance is a stock variable, while speed (miles per hour, for
example) is a flow variable. In economics, common stock/flow distinctions include
prices (stock) versus inflation (flow), and wealth (stock) versus income (flow).
1. Debt and Deficits
In government accounting, debt is a stock variable, because it measures the total
amount of money at any given moment that a government owes its creditors. The deficit
is a flow variable, measuring the net amount of new borrowing that the government has
engaged in during the course of a year (or any other unit of time). Deficits are, properly
measured, the change in debt as time passes.
Importantly, the total amount of federal government debt that exists at a given
moment is also tautologically equal to the total number of dollars of Treasury securities
in circulation at any moment. Since the federal government borrows money by selling
Treasury Bills, Notes, and Bonds, the face value of those outstanding securities is equal
to the National Debt.
Here, however, is one of the first places where reality and theory diverge. The
different agencies of the federal government often hold each other’s debt instruments, so
the net federal debt is lower than the number of bonds that have been issued but not
redeemed. The difference is not trivial. While the infamous “National Debt Clock” (the
ever-rising digital readout of the nation’s supposed indebtedness, expressed both in the
aggregate and as “Your Family’s Share”) shows an outstanding federal debt of over $7.1
trillion in April 2004,20 just over $4 trillion of that total was held outside of the federal

20

U.S. National Debt Clock, http://www.brillig.com/debt_clock/ (visited April 7, 2004).
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government’s own offices.21 This was why the National Debt Clock did not initially
decline when the federal government ran surpluses in the late twentieth century. Even
though the government was extinguishing debt held by the public, the total number of
bonds in existence was not going down, so “the national debt”—by that meaningless
measure—was not shrinking.
2. Dollars vs. Percentages
The common practice of expressing debt and deficits in total dollars rather than as
percentages of national income can also be highly misleading. Politicians in the late
1980s talked of “$200 billion deficits as far as the eye can see” as if that was an
unimaginable calamity. In fact, given that nominal GDP doubles roughly every twelve
years, $200 billion annual deficits would be trivial in relatively short order.
In the U.S., deficits as a percentage of GDP peaked in the mid-1980s at roughly
6%, and the publicly-held debt peaked at around the same time at 60% of GDP. This
was, of course, only the recent peak and was not even close to the 125% debt level
reached at the end of World War II, when we wisely spent enormous sums of borrowed
money to finance the war against the Axis powers. This ratio had steadily fallen to the
point where it was below 50% by the early 1980’s, and then rose for over a decade before
falling again in the late 1990’s and early in the new century. The current return to deficit
spending finds projected deficits at about 4.2% of GDP in 2004 ($477 billion), and the
federal debt at 38.2% ($4,385 billion).22

21

Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts, Table D.3 (Debt Outstanding by Sector), March

4, 2004.
22

Congressional Budget Office, CBO’s Current Budget Projections (March Baseline Projections),
March 2004.
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3. Federal vs. State and Local
A third measurement issue carries more direct implications for policy debates.
Typically, commentators separate the federal debt and deficit from the state and local
fiscal positions. Since the state and local sector tended until very recently to run
aggregate operating surpluses, the decision to exclude the state and local sector when
discussing the “government” deficit and debt naturally made the situation look worse—
while the current situation of chronic state deficits is ignored by federal measures of
borrowing. Foreign economists view this practice as nothing less than bizarre, because
the macroeconomic consequences of debt and deficits surely do not depend on the
hierarchical level of the government entity that is doing the borrowing.23
In addition to being logically incoherent, this practice has perverse policy affects
as well. When national politicians view their job as reducing the federal deficit or debt,
they are tempted either to ignore the consequences of their decisions on lower levels of
government or even deliberately to shift spending requirements downward.24
B. Cash-Flow Deficit Measures
While the issues discussed briefly above have important implications for
discussing the status of fiscal policy in the United States, the discussion that follows
attempts to follow the current norms in describing deficit measures. Even within the

23

Wynne Godley, Seven Unsustainable Processes: Medium-Term Prospects and Policies for the
United States and the World. Special Report: The Levy Economics Institute (revised Oct. 5, 2000), at 2
(“In the United States the public discussion of fiscal policy concentrates almost exclusively on the
operations of the federal government. Yet state and local governments account for about a third of all
public expenditure and taxes; moreover, their budgets are generally in surplus so that these authorities are
now in substantial credit . . . . In what follows, government inflows and outflows--and debts--will always
refer to the operations of the "general government" (the combined federal, state, and local governments).”)
24
See, for example, Kevin Sack, States Expecting to Lose Billions From Repeal of U.S. Estate Tax,
The New York Times, June 21, 2001.
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federal-only measures, however, there are significant disagreements about what is the
true measure of fiscal policy.
1. On-Budget and Off-Budget
Even if one looks only at the federal government, the annual deficit is more
manipulable than it might seem. A spending program can exist in a netherworld outside
of the official budget simply by act of Congress. There need be no economic rationale
for the decision. The 1991 Gulf War was carried off budget, for example, and the current
operations in Iraq are being funded by emergency appropriations. By far the biggest offbudget item, of course, is the Social Security system. The current surplus in that system
(approximately $161 billion in 2004, or 1.4% of GDP) makes the total deficit smaller
than the on-budget deficit ($638 billion, or 5.6% of GDP), but when Social Security starts
to run deficits after the next decade or so, the on-budget deficit will be smaller than the
total deficit.25
The debate about whether the Social Security Trust Fund has any meaning is, of
course, an important factor in determining whether the on-budget or total deficit is the
proper measure. Because I conclude that the total deficit is the better of the two, in that it
measures the amount of money that the federal government is draining from the financial
markets in a given year, I will focus on that measure of the deficit and possible ways to
improve it.26

25

All estimates in this paragraph are from Congressional Budget Office, CBO’s Current Budget
Projections (March Baseline Projections), March 2004.
26
For a persuasive argument that the Social Security system should not be seen as an individualized
benefit plan but rather as a redistributive fiscal program, see, Deborah A. Geier, Integrating the Federal
Tax Burden on Labor Income, 98 Tax Notes 563, 574 (Jan. 27, 2003) (citing generally Patricia E. Dilley,
Taking Public Rights Private: The Rhetoric and Reality of Social Security Privatization. 41 B.C. L. Rev.
975 (2000)).
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2. Cyclical Adjustment
For macroeconomists, one of the most important measurement issues in deficit
accounting is adjustment of the deficit for changes in the health of the economy. When
the business cycle turns, tax receipts and government expenditures naturally change along
with the GDP. Recessions bring lower revenues and higher expenditures, and boom
times do the opposite. When comparing deficits at two points in time, therefore, it is
important to ask, “What would the deficit be today if the economy were fully healthy?”
What is means to be “fully healthy” is, of course, a matter of contention.
Nevertheless, there is a widely-accepted measure of the cyclically-adjusted deficit known
as the Standardized-Budget Deficit, computed by determining the flows of revenues and
expenditures if the unemployment rate were at its trend rate. In 2003, because of the
lingering effects of the recession, the unadjusted total deficit was $375 billion (3.4% of
GDP), while the Standardized-Budget Deficit was $313 billion (2.8% of GDP).27
Failing to adjust the deficit for cyclical effects leads to two problems. First, it
confuses cause and effect. Improvements in the economy cause decreases in the nonadjusted deficit; but decreases in the cyclically-adjusted deficit (all else constant) cause
the economy to decline. Second, and far more importantly, it causes perverse policy
moves, as a worsening economy causes the deficit to rise, and attempts to reduce the
deficit with further cuts in spending (and perhaps increases in taxes) will only further
weaken the economy. President Bush’s symbolic refusal to spend money that Congress
had allocated, noted above, clearly demonstrates this perversity.28

27

Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2005 to 2014,
Appendix F, Tables F-12 and F-13, January 2004.
28
See notes 3-5, supra, and associated text.
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Nor is this failure to comprehend simple macroeconomics confined to the United
States. The Japanese economy went into its first of several severe downturns in 1989.
By 1996, with the domestic economy still in deep trouble, Japanese policymakers relied
on more budget-cutting and tax increases to improve the economy—the macroeconomic
equivalent of “bleeding” a patient to restore her to health. Yet policymakers there and
elsewhere remained puzzled by their patients’ continued ill health.29 “[M]any economists
believe that Japan’s long stagnation in the 1990s largely reflected timid policymakers
unwilling to boldly use the levers of fiscal and monetary policy.”30
The practical consequences of failing to adjust for the business cycle are
especially severe for state and local governments, most of which operate under
(modified) balanced budget requirements.31 When the economy is strong (which means
that, by definition, workers are scarce because their prospects are so good in the private
sector), states flush with money compete with prosperous companies for workers and
other economic resources. Roads are torn up and re-built precisely when the disruption
from such projects is the most damaging, as the overburdened highways are filled with
vehicles carrying the evidence of economic prosperity. Then, when the economy

29

“Exasperation as Tight Budgets Don't Deliver Growth...” Nomura Securities Research Report,
August, 1996 (“Low inflation and trimming of fiscal deficits have always been regarded as a foolproof
recipe for economic growth. However, that conventional wisdom has been turned upside down in the past
few years, as politicians in developed economies have grown exasperated by the failure of high growth to
materialize despite their belt tightening efforts. Average real GDP growth in the major industrialized
nations was 4.0-4.5% in the 1970s, and 3.0-3.5% in the 1980s- but in the 1990smany believe the figure will
be a meager 2.0%.”)
30
Christopher Farrell, Capitalism’s Savior, Business Week, Apr. 12, 2004, at 20.
31
See discussion in “Capital Budgeting,” below.
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weakens, states see their tax revenues decline, lay off workers, and leave highways in
disrepair. It would be difficult to design a more perverse system.32
3. Unfunded Liabilities
The closest one comes in the traditional deficit debates to the central issues of
long-term budgeting (which are the focus of Generational Accounting) is the discussion
of “unfunded liabilities.” The basic idea is that government projects that involve
spending in the future can be thought of as liabilities that must be accounted for when
looking forward. This sensible observation, though, can only be useful inasmuch as
projects have dedicated financing. If a high school is built with proceeds from a bond
sale, for example, the liability is funded if the school district commits the funds in future
budgets to cover the bond payments. Otherwise, the project is unfunded.
Since most government programs are not financed through dedicated funds, of
course, virtually any project could be called an unfunded liability. The Interior
Department, the Army Corps of Engineers, etc., are all unfunded, and they will continue
to be so for as long as they last. Hence, as appealing as the idea is, making the unfunded
liabilities concept operational is daunting at best. Estimates of unfunded liabilities are
also highly responsive to changes in the law, and their size can dwarf the rest of the
budget. The estimate of unfunded liabilities in the Social Security system after the
change in withholding taxes in the early 1980’s, for example, swung from several trillion
dollars in unfunded liability to several trillion dollars in unfunded surplus.33 Generational
Accounting is arguably an improvement on the arbitrary nature of these estimates, as I

32

This is not to say that highways are the be-all and end-all of economic spending. In this analysis,
they are simply the most intuitive example of public spending on infrastructure.
33
Social Security Trustees, cited in Buchanan, infra note __.
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discuss below; but GA’s other shortcomings ultimately make it an unappealing
alternative.
4. Extended Budget Projections
All of the budget measures discussed above are measured in annual terms. It is
possible, of course, to use a different arbitrary time period in such an analysis. During
the Clinton Administration, it became common to provide ten-year projections of
budgets, to allow policymakers to look into the relatively foreseeable future and
determine whether a budget or tax measure was likely to become more or less
manageable over time. The current Bush Administration has discontinued the ten-year
projections in favor of five-year projections, a move that has generated suspicion that the
full costs of their policy proposals are “back-loaded.” It is, of course, possible to backload even on a ten-year horizon.
The arbitrary nature of these cutoffs is, as discussed in the next section, a strong
argument in favor of adopting an infinite-horizon model along the lines of Generational
Accounting. Nevertheless, because of the critical problems in lengthening the time
horizon, the ten-year projections are probably the best compromise available. This point
will be taken up below.
C. Effects on Consumption and Investment
The payoff for making these adjustments to the measurement of the fiscal deficit
comes in analyzing the effects of current deficits on the use of society’s productive
resources (labor, machinery, factories, land, etc.). If the government hires resources to
build or produce goods and services, and if those resources would have been used to
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produce something of value to private citizens, then the government has “crowded out”
private activity. If the government crowds out private consumption, then there is at worst
no effect on future generations, because private consumption would not have benefited
future generations in any case. In such a situation, the government can make future
generations better off if it replaces private consumption with public investment, or it can
simply substitute one kind of consumption for another—leaving future generations
unaffected.
The serious concern, of course, is that the government will not crowd out private
consumption but will, instead, crowd out private investment. If the government wastes
money that would have gone toward private investment in productive equipment, for
example, then the future standard of living of the country is compromised. In fact, even
if the government invests resources in productive assets, it can still make matters worse if
the assets it crowds out would have been more productive than the government’s
investment projects. What is often forgotten, however, is the other possibility—that the
government might crowd out a private investment project with a public investment
project that is even more productive. Rather than building a strip mall, for example,
resources might be used to build a children’s hospital.34
While there is no precise way to know the exact nature of these tradeoffs, the
fundamental question could not be more important: What effect will the government’s
decisions today have on the economy’s productive capacity—and thus the real standard
of living—tomorrow? It is here that our concern for future generations should be

34

Although the discussion here focuses on spending projects, taxing decisions can be analyzed in
precisely the same fashion. Every aspect of the tax code has the potential to change consumption decisions
into investment decisions, investments into consumption, less productive investments into more productive
investments, etc.
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concentrated. Using annual accounts (even properly measured accounts), however, will
still arguably not capture the full effects of our taxing and spending decisions.

In summary, if we are to improve public discussion of the government’s fiscal
situation, the least radical alternative would be to adopt a cyclically-adjusted deficit
(preferably for the entire government sector, though that appears unlikely). Such a
measure, while still imperfect, would allow policymakers to focus on the possible
crowding out caused by its annual fiscal policies. Longer-term forecasts would still be
valuable in many instances. While imperfect, such measures provide policymakers with
useful guidance in looking past the current fiscal year.

II.

Fiscal Gaps and Generational Accounting
The structure of Generational Accounting is built upon some very appealing

foundational arguments. First, as noted above, deficit accounting is arbitrary, because
there is nothing special about a year as the unit of analysis.35 Indeed, arbitrarily aiming to
balance annual books can introduce its own set of bizarre games. After taking office in
2001, the second Bush administration changed the national accounts such that some
corporate tax revenues would be credited in October 2001 rather than in September of
that year. Because the federal government’s fiscal year runs from October 1 through
September 30, this move reduced the (then-projected) surplus for fiscal 2001 and
increased it for fiscal 2002.

35

Some states use biennial budgeting, which is no more nor less arbitrary than annual budgeting.
Page 19

http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art8

This gamesmanship came to light after the 2001 tax cut was passed, when it
appeared that the on-budget surplus might actually slip into deficit for the first time in
several years. Democrats were quick to accuse the new administration of fiscal
irresponsibility, and the administration quickly assured everyone that the on-budget
surplus would still be $8 billion.36
Second, even without any such political games, there is no good analytical reason
to assess government programs on an annual basis. Projects that last longer than a year
should be analyzed in their relevant time frame. Surely, a year is fartoo short a time in
which to measure meaningfully the impact on the economy of the vast majority of
government programs and tax policies.
Of course, once one realizes that a year is arbitrary, one must also recognize that
there is no non-arbitrary alternative. The infinite future is out there, and perhaps the best
way to proceed is to use the simple financial concept of net present value discounting to
bring all future receipts and expenditures into one current estimate. This approach has an
added benefit, in that it avoids the issue of whether a program has a dedicated financing
mechanism. While it arguably makes sense to compare the long-term planned
expenditures and expected receipts for something like the highway trust fund, the
majority of government programs can only meaningfully be assessed in the aggregate,
because the FBI (for example) is not supported by its own tax regime.

36

In a $10 trillion economy with a $2 trillion budget, the idea that we can predict an $8 billion
surplus—less than one half of one percent of spending—stretches credulity. Such a small number is little
more than rounding error.
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A. Computing the Accounts
1. The Fiscal Gap
The fundamental analytical achievement of the generational accounting
framework is its attempt to compute an aggregate, discounted federal37 deficit or surplus
into the infinite future. Estimates generated using a GA framework have been included
in federal budget documents,38 and Professor Kotlikoff has provided a great deal of input
to the work of the Congressional Budget Office.
The basic logic of GA is quite simple. Imagine that current law remains
unchanged indefinitely. What are the likely paths of government spending and tax
receipts, given expected trends in population, economic growth, etc.? Given those likely
paths, what is the aggregate gap between spending and tax revenues into the infinite
future? Taking the analysis one step further, it is then theoretically possible to estimate
the net amount of money that an individual will pay in taxes to their government over
their lifetime.
The appeal of moving to long-term budget calculations loses its luster rather
quickly, however, in the face of the complexity of long term budget estimation. Consider
the inputs necessary to generate a GA estimate. Tax receipts for each future year must be
calculated on the basis of estimates of the number of taxpayers, their gross incomes, their
deductions (and exclusions and exemptions), and their tax rates. Only the last of these
numbers is written into law (and highly variable law at that), whereas the others depend

37

Note, though, that this is still only a federal calculation. If one were to adopt GA as the preferred
accounting framework, it would surely be desirable to extend it to the entire government sector.
38
See citations in Robert Haveman, Should Generational Accounts Replace the Annual Budget
Estimates? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1994, at 95 n.1.
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on long-term estimates of birth rates, death rates, net immigration rates, productivity
growth rates, homeownership rates, trends in medical insurance coverage by the private
sector, and on and on.
Certainly, some long-term estimates can be quite reliable. Birth and death rates
change rather slowly, so projecting the number of native-born Americans likely to be
living in thirty or forty years is not much of a stretch. On the other hand, other estimates
are notoriously volatile. The CBO has changed its estimates of annual deficits, for
example, by as much as 100% over the space of several months. Even longer-term
forecasts, which are plausibly less prone to temporary blips, are more prone to
cumulative error.39 Indeed, even history is unstable, as the “New Economy’s”
performance in the 1990’s has been substantially written down.
By far the most important forecast that goes into the generational accounts’
calculations is the time path of labor productivity growth.40 The Trustees of the Social
Security Administration produces four estimates of this path: the pessimistic scenario, the
mid-range scenarios (two paths that differ only slightly) and the so-called “rosy
scenario.” The Trustees (and GA) tend to default to the mid-range scenarios, choosing
the “moderate” path between pessimism and optimism. On that basis, the long-term
forecasts for the Social Security Trust Fund turn negative in the aggregate in less than
forty years, and the Social Security system runs an annual deficit in less than twenty

39

The pioneering economic forecaster Otto Eckstein, founder of Data Resources, Inc. (now
DRI/McGraw-Hill) once said to his graduate students: “You can believe our quarterly forecasts rounded to
a full percentage point (e.g., 4.3% growth forecasts mean that growth will be somewhere in the
neighborhood of 4% in the next quarter). You can believe the sign of our annual forecasts. And you
should just ignore our five-year projections.”
40
Other variables are obviously important, but less so. Choosing an interest rate for the net present
value calculation is essential, for example, and has a highly significant impact on the overall calculations.
See Haveman, supra note 33, at 103-04.
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years. Similarly, GA relies on these estimates to show that the entire government
(including Medicare, which is important because it is a large source of the long-term
deficits in these calculations) faces an increasingly unbalanced set of books as we move
into the future.
The picture is far less grim than these calculations suggest, however. The “rosy”
scenario is, in fact, hardly pie-in-the-sky. Indeed, its projections of long-term changes in
productivity growth are rather moderate compared to the last half-century of U.S.
performance.41 Indeed, the rates of growth projected in the mid-range scenarios are
below the average of most decades in the twentieth century other than the Great
Depression years of the 1930’s. Yet, even with those pessimistic assumptions, only a
tiny improvement in productivity growth would wipe out the long-range deficits in the
Trustees’ accounts for Social Security.
A recent calculation of this Fiscal Gap, using the most current version of the
Generational Accounting methodology, has been provided by Gokhale and Smetters.42
Admirably transparent in its description of how the calculations were derived,43 this study
estimates a Fiscal Gap of $44.2 trillion, of which $7 trillion is attributable to Social
Security, $36.6 trillion is attributable to Medicare (split roughly equally between Part A
and Part B), and only $0.5 trillion is attributable to the rest of the federal government.44
Gokhale and Smetters provide a range of scenarios under which the Fiscal Gap could be

41

Cite and numbers.
Jagadeesh Gokhale and Kent Smetters. Fiscal and Generational Imbalances: New Budget
Measures for New Budget Priorities. The AEI Press (2003).
43
While the discussion of the mechanics of their estimates is clear, it is hardly dispassionate. Words
like “drastic” permeate the discussion, which (given the study’s conclusions) perhaps understandably
presents an urgent (even alarmist) tone.
44
Id. at 3. (Gokhale and Smetters prefer the term Fiscal Imbalance, but I will use the more common
Fiscal Gap.) This is a midpoint estimate. The lower bound is $29 trillion, while the higher bound—“under
still quite conservative assumptions”—is $64 trillion. Id. at 6.
42
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erased, suggesting as their most likely choice an immediate and permanent 16.6%
increase in wage taxes.45 Updated estimates based on the same model (crucially
including the just-passed Medicare drug benefit) show the Fiscal Gap to have reached
approximately $70 trillion. In the discussion below, however, I will focus on the
Gokhale and Smetters estimates from 2003, in part because of their clarity, and in part
because the analysis will show that the exact numbers provided by such studies are
ultimately not helpful in fiscal analysis.46
2. Lifetime Net Tax Rates
Although it is analytically separable from the long-term budgeting calculation, the
“generational” part of Generational Accounting is where its political impact becomes
most potent. Kotlikoff suggests that it is possible to move from the “What if we did
nothing?” question to compare the treatment of different generations based on their
lifetime receipts of government benefits and their lifetime tax payments. Using the same
method described above, it is possible to choose arbitrary cutoff dates for different
generations and then to calculate their “lifetime net tax rates,” i.e., the net present value
of their lifetime tax payments minus the net present value of their lifetime governmentpaid benefits.
Seeming to confirm the suspicion that a large population cohort in a democracy
could distort the benefit system in its favor (especially in a democracy in which the
young are less likely to vote), Kotlikoff made national headlines when he announced in

45

Id. at 6.
The $44 trillion figure has also received prominent placement recently in The New York Times.
See Edmund L. Andrews, Fearing That a Gap Will Become a Chasm, The New York Times, Mar. 2, 2004,
C1.

46
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1993 that the lifetime net tax rate of younger generations would be 71%, whereas the rate
for Baby Boomers would be 35%, and the rate for current retirees was 21%.47 A few
years later, the numbers became even more dramatic, when the 71% figure was increased
to 84%.48
B. Weaknesses in Generational Accounting
As appealing as the basic foundations of GA might be, however, the theory does
not deliver what it promises. Far from being a neutral tool for dispassionate evaluation
by policymakers, the generational accounting model makes the fiscal horizon look far
worse than it will probably be, and these results have colored the policy debate for the
worse. Moreover, the claim that GA calculations can act as a default early-warning
system is at best overdrawn. It is simply not possible to define a clean baseline. Finally,
the economic assumptions on which GA is based are too fragile to use for meaningful
policy analysis.
1. Paying Down the Debt
The source of the huge differences between generations noted above is quite
peculiar. The generational accounts assume that, as of the date that an account is
calculated, there are two groups of citizens: the generations that are already born and the
one that is about to be born.49 Then, the accounts compute the taxes that the already-born

47

Kotlikoff, supra note 4 (“Deficit Delusion”).
Cohen, supra note 6, cites this higher figure, as does Shaviro, supra note 8, at 716. On the other
hand, when Kotlikoff recently recalculated his generational accounts and found that the 84% rate for future
generations had fallen to 35.81% (cited in Shaviro, supra note 12, at 150), the “good” news was not met
with fanfare. (The incredible precision of those estimates is a separate issue.)
49
This means, of course, that the political audience for these estimates, the younger non-voters, was
in fact not included in the group that is supposed to be paying nearly all of their lifetime income in net
taxes.
48
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will pay minus the direct cash benefits that they will receive (which are in part known,
because some taxes and expenditures are already history), under the current tax and
spending regimes.
The soon-to-be-born are, however, treated differently.50 For them, lifetime taxes
include not just those that they would be forced to pay under current law, but also taxes
sufficient to pay down the entire national debt (accumulated before they were born)
during their lifetimes.51 There is no good reason to assume that the entire national debt
will or must be paid in that time, but that is the assumption thatdrove the dramatic 84%
result.
On its own, of course, this assumption cannot help but make things look much
worse for the new generation. With an entire lifetime of work ahead of them, and with
the government unable to borrow money, they must pay for their own benefits as well as
those of their parents and grandparents. The older generations, meanwhile, had a good
ride, and they are allowed to continue that ride even while their heirs are paying for the
difference.52
The generational impact of current fiscal policy, however, is better viewed
through the more traditional crowding-out lens. Current deficits are likely to decrease
future growth in GDP, which makes future generations worse off than they otherwise
would be. The inter-generational comparisons are becoming less relevant as the
generations that benefited from the expansion of Social Security and Medicare die off.

50

Haveman, supra note __, at 100.
Id. at n.5 (“In effect, there are two implicit fiscal regimes in place during the future years when
both members of current generations and members of future generations are living.”)
52
Since the government’s bondholders tend to be older (especially indirectly through retirement
funds), this also skews the inter-generational comparison as income is redistributed upward.
51
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Moving forward, the real question is reduced to the now-versus-later question that has
always been the central focus of budgetary analysis. We cannot know whether any single
future generation will be called upon to pay down the debt; but we can say that any
decision that raises deficits at one point in time is likely to cumulatively lower future
GDP.
2. Benefits Not Counted in a Generation’s Accounts
The calculation of any particular generation’s lifetime net tax rate also excludes
many of the indirect benefits provided by governments—indeed, the very benefits for
which governments are traditionally thought to exist. The only benefits that go into the
GA calculation are those that are paid in cash. The benefits from cleaner air, pleasant
parks, medical research and development, lower crime, etc. are not a benefit. Taxes pay
for them, but they are a net cost of government in the GA calculations.53
It is not clear a priori how this fault in the generational accounts would affect
inter-generational comparisons. Indeed, it is imaginable that these benefits are so diffuse
that they benefit every citizen equally. It is also possible, though, that some of these
benefits are disproportionately shared. The cost of educating the Baby Boomers was
borne by our parents, yet all future generations will benefit from it.
Leaving that very open question aside, though, the fact that the GA calculations of
lifetime net tax rates are skewed upward is important simply because it skews the
political response. If the members of Gen X are told that their net tax rate is 84%, while
that of their parents is 35%, they are likely to have two responses: 1) Our generation is

53

It is, of course, always possible to adjust the GA calculations to take these non-cash benefits into
account. To the extent that this can be done, GA begins to resemble capital budgeting—which is all to the
better. See below.
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being cheated, and 2) All generations are being cheated! After all, while 35% is better
than 84%, paying more than a third of your lifetime earnings to a government that
(according to this model) does not do anything useful with the money is pretty upsetting.
If, on the other hand, the numbers were 8.4% and 3.5%, the magnitude of the
inter-generational backlash would be muted (since outrage is likely to be at least partly
based on the magnitude of the difference as well as the proportional comparison), and the
anti-government reaction might not even register politically.
In other words, the effects on society of this widely-quoted statistic go beyond the
simple, modest claim that GA is just a diagnostic tool. It is a political tool, and its affects
are predictable.
3. Demographic Trends
The most important demographic phenomenon facing the U.S. and other Western
countries is the Baby Boom and the subsequent dramatic decline in birth rates after 1964.
While this phenomenon will end within a few decades, at least some parts of the longterm GA deficit are not going to be solved simply by the death of the Boomers.
The more important trend is the general increase in life expectancies over the long
term. Indeed, given long-term trends in health, even after the 75-year window, the paths
of receipts and expenditures continue to diverge, as an increasingly large non-working
aged population consumes more of the economy’s resources, largely through the health
care system.
If this is accurate, it would mean that the focus should not be on the effects of the
Baby Boomers but on reining in our seemingly insatiable appetites for medical care.
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While that might be a wise policy on its own, however, the GA framework does not
provide a compelling reason to adopt such limits.
For example, Shaviro cites research indicating that healthcare expenditures on the
elderly will continue to rise significantly relative to GDP.54 This, however, assumes that
health care spending on an aging population will show the same trends as current health
care expenditures. For example, if the typical 75-year-old today consumes $X of health
care, and if there will be twice as many living 75-year-olds in 50 years, then it would
appear that health care spending would have to double in the future. This assumes, in
turn, that even though life expectancies will rise, elder health at specific ages will not
improve.
We know, however, that a large fraction of the money spent on health care is
spent at the very end of life—heroic, life-prolonging procedures that add a few weeks or
months to the lives of chronically ill patients. If those chronically ill patients do not
become chronically ill until twenty years later in life, however, there is no reason why
overall health care spending must rise—even if we fail to change the way we deal with
end-of-life decisions.
This is not to say that it is impossible to imagine a future with higher health care
expenditures. It does indicate, however, just how difficult it is to rely on estimates of
health-related spending decades in the future.
The calculations in Gokhale and Smetters, on the other hand, are based on a much
simpler assumption, that medical care will grow for the next 75 years at a rate one
percentage point faster than the growth rate of GDP, then fallover the ensuing 20 years

54

Shaviro, supra note __, at 152.
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to grow at a rate equal to GDP growth. These assumptions mirror those made by the
Medicare Trustees.55 The significance of these assumptions is considered below.

C. The Policy Imperatives
The policy regime that GA calls for is clear: Fiscal contraction, austerity, and
pain. The positive spin is that the pain can be “shared.” Two somewhat inconsistent
norms are offered in designing policies to redress the long-term imbalances.
1. The Norm of Generational Equality
The most obvious norm, which Kotlikoff explicitly relies upon, is simple
generational equality.56 Every generation should pay a lifetime net tax rate no higher
than the last. Other than symmetry, there is no apparent philosophical imperative behind
this norm. Indeed, since the whole notion of lifetime net tax rates tells us nothing about
real living standards (net of those tax rates), there is no obvious reason to be concerned
about lifetime net tax rates per se.
2. The Norm of Shared Sacrifice
Recognizing this, Shaviro argues for the norm not of equal tax rates but of shared
sacrifice. “With respect to generational distribution, once the members of a given age
cohort have died, they can no longer be asked to share in the pain of tax increases or
benefit reductions.”57 In other words, it is important to take the benefits away from the
old people now because they are alive now. While there are certainly colorable (but

55
56
57

Gokhale and Smetters, supra note __, at 23.
See Diamond, supra note __, at 1.
Shaviro, supra note __, at 155.
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highly debatable) arguments that the elderly over-consume,58 the current elderly also
have a strong argument that they earned it.
D. Generational Accounting Without Generations?
Populist appeal aside, the importance of the GA approach should not be underestimated. Kotlikoff and his co- authors argue that they have created a meaningful
baseline, allowing us to assess the effects of any proposed government policy over the
long run, and potentially comparing that affect on different age groups. If these claims
were true, then it would be important for everyone to send their policy proposals through
the GA machine. If the results of such an analysis turned out negative, the policy would
be presumed harmful until proven beneficial.
On the other hand, it is also possible to take the generations out of generational
accounting, by simply stopping after we compute the Fiscal Gap. We can look at longterm trends and calculate long-term tax revenues and government spending assuming a
continuation of current policies. If this calculation shows a deficit, then it is a warning:
Unless something is changed, the government will have to cut spending or raise taxes on
future generations. While we might still choose to do nothing, the argument continues, at
least GA gives us a fair number to work from.59
1. Another Baseline Problem
The supposed agnosticism behind GA calculations thus rests on the idea that they
are warnings, not predictions. Indeed, if GA is used as its proponents suggest, we enable

58

See Cohen, supra note __.
Even Haveman, supra note __, despite offering a withering criticism of GA, allows that this “base
case” analysis can provide useful information. Id. at 100, 110.

59
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ourselves to make “tough but sensible” choices now to prevent the disaster that surely
awaits us if we fail to act.60 In fact, though, the theory is not agnostic, and its proponents’
call to action rests on weak assumptions.
The underlying question is one of default. Once the cross-generational
comparisons are set aside, GA claims to ask, in essence: “If we were to change absolutely
nothing, and if we can believe the forecasts on which our estimates are based, are our
current fiscal policies allowing living generations to steal economic resources from their
grandchildren and their grandchildren’s grandchildren?” But it does not stop there. If the
answer to that question is yes, then the argument is that we must act now. Why now?
Because our current path is unsustainable, and delay is only going to allow matters to get
worse.61 Sacrifice today means sowing a greater harvest tomorrow.
While this logic surely appeals to our Puritan roots, it is misleading. We should
only enact new policies now if we believe that we will not change policies along the way
for other reasons. By way of analogy, consider the argument (known as “bracket creep”)
that tax rates in the 1970’s would have led to an ever-higher percentage of GDP being
collected by the IRS, because inflation was pushing everyone inexorably into the highest
tax brackets. If that argument had been coupled with a call to raise government spending
immediately, because we can count on ever-higher revenues in the future, then surely that
would have been foolish. Everyone knew that Congress would pass regular tax cuts to
undo the effects of bracket creep; so even if no one anticipated the indexing of brackets to

60

Shaviro, supra note __, at 716 (arguing that politicians should “openly fac[e] today painful
choices that ultimately will have to be faced anyway.”)
61
Id. (arguing that we should act “sooner rather than later”). See also Gokhale and Smetters at 3.
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inflation in the 1981 tax bill, certainly no one thought that everyone would end up in the
70% tax bracket when inflation had made even a street-sweeper “rich.”62
Similarly, the GA call to action loses much of its appeal when we realize that this
“interesting calculation” is based on some extremely arbitrary economic forecasts63
combined with the arbitrary assumption that only a few things are set in stone. Consider
the current path of tax rates. Current tax law is in a bizarre state, because of the ten-year
reversion feature of the 2001 tax bill.64 The estate tax is set to decline, disappear, and
reappear. The 28% tax bracket declines to 25% and then returns to 28% (with similar
moves in the other brackets, and some brackets merging into others only to reappear in
2011). No one expects the reversion to happen. The House in 2002 passed, on partisan
lines, a bill to make the 2001 cuts permanent—although no one viewed that action as
anything more than election year posturing. Even with the current one-party dominance
of the federal government increasing the likelihood of tax cuts, it is not clear what form
those cuts will take.
With the status quo ante not a serious possibility, and the status quo post unlikely
ever to become the status quo at all, how can one even formulate a call to action on the
basis of a GA calculation? In addition, current projections assume that the Alternative
Minimum Tax (which is not indexed to inflation) will remain in place, even though it will

62

There are, of course, strong political economy arguments for indexing the tax code rather than
relying on ad hoc corrections; but those are beside the point here.
63
See Haveman, supra note __, at 99 n.4.
64
Because of a self-imposed super-majority voting requirement in the Senate, bills that would reduce
tax revenues beyond ten years from the effective date of a bill require sixty votes to pass. Lacking
sufficient votes, the Senate made all provisions of the 2001 tax act void in 2011.
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almost surely be altered or repealed when it begins to affect large sections of the middle
class.65
Carrying this over to the demographic argument is potentially even more
devastating to the GA position. If the time paths of revenues and expenditures do not
come back together after the death of the Baby Boom generation because of the trends in
life expectancies, then surely it is important to forecast how those longer life expectancies
will change both individual behavior and government policy. As people live longer, they
will naturally use more economic resources, including medical care. (They might also
produce more economic resources.) Based on current law in which retirement ages are
rising to 67 and then staying put, GA estimates would have us believe that in 75 years—
assuming that all of the other forecasts over that time span are true—we will have a
nation of impressively healthy septuagenarians (and older) living off of the sweat of a
relatively tiny population of younger workers.
Why make the assumption that the retirement age (effective if not statutory) will
remain fixed as the population inevitably ages healthfully? Boredom alone is likely to
lead to a changed politics of retirement. While an advocate of GA can always claim that
their calculations can tell us what happens if retirement ages do not change, that is a far
cry from justifying the argument that we need to cut benefits and raise taxes today on
Medicare beneficiaries in order to bring the long-term budget into balance.
Indeed, Gokhale and Smetters do allow themselves to make a single departure
from their blanket assumption that policy is set in stone. Separate from the “bracket
creep” caused by inflation, real economic growth can cause “real bracket creep,” whereby
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Leonard E. Burman, et al., The Individual AMT: Problems and Potential Solutions, Tax Policy
Center Discussion Paper No. 5 (2002).
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increases in real income cause every taxpayer’s income ultimately to rise to the highest
bracket. Gokhale and Smetters quite reasonably view this is absurd and thus assume that
the brackets will be adjusted over time to prevent this from happening. This, of course,
makes the estimated Fiscal Gap look worse; but more importantly, it raises the question
of why this is the only concession to reality that is allowed in the estimates going
forward.
2. The Fiscal Gap and the Annual Deficit
The absolute size of the estimated Fiscal Gap is important for another reason.
“[T]he [Fiscal Gap] grows by about $1.6 trillion per year to $54 trillion by just 2008
unless corrective policies are implemented before then. This rapid annual increment is
also about ten times as large as the official annual deficit reported for fiscal year 2002.”66
This suggests that the “true” deficit is not measured accurately by the annual cash-flow
deficit but by the change in the Fiscal Gap from year to year. Because that annual
change, in the absence of policy enactments, is simply equal to the previous year’s Fiscal
Gap times the assumed annual interest rate, this annual quasi-deficit measure will be
much smaller if we allow the forecasts in the Fiscal Gap to include changes in retirement
ages, health care cost trends, etc. If the estimated Fiscal Gap were only $15 trillion, in
other words, the annual quasi-deficit would be just over $500 billion, whereas a Fiscal
Gap of $88 trillion would imply an annual quasi-deficit of $3.2 trillion. The annual
changes depend completely on the accuracy of the aggregate estimate.
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Gokhale and Smetters, at 3.
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3. Making the Fiscal Gap Disappear
Even if it were possible to agree on the likely future path of policy decisions, the
Fiscal Gap can be manipulated simply by enacting policies which will take effect in the
future. If, instead of Gokhale and Smetters’s suggested immediate increase in wage taxes
of 16.6%, Congress enacted an increase in wage taxes that started at 0.1% in twenty years
and rose to some level well in excess of 16.6% twenty years later, the Fiscal Gap would
immediately become zero. Cynics would argue that this is non-credible, and they would
have a point. As enacted policy, however, such a law would make the Fiscal Gap equal
to zero, by definition. The annual quasi-deficit would then also equal zero. While
nothing would have changed, these fiscal measures would show nothing amiss. It is true
that there would still be a relative burdening of future generations, but not one that has
changed because of the adoption of the new law.
4. How Far Into the Future?
Finally, Gokhale and Smetters use an infinite horizon rather than the 75-year
horizon that is the norm in such analyses. As they point out, their model predicts a Social
Security gap of $1.6 trillion, compared to an infinite-horizon gap of $7 trillion, while the
75-year Medicare gap is $15.1 trillion, compared to the $36.6 trillion in their infinitehorizon model.67 In other words, over sixty percent of the Fiscal Gap occurs from 2078
through infinity.
Given that the bulk of the estimated Fiscal Gap, both pre- and post-2078, is
caused by the Medicare growth assumption, it is probably more accurate to describe any
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Gokhale and Smetters, at 34.
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long-term fiscal crisis as a health care crisis.68 If the cost of medical care continues to
grow in future decades at rates exceeding the growth rate of GDP, then certainly a policy
intervention will become necessary. Prescribing policy initiatives for current lawmakers
on the basis of such broad assumptions (even if those assumptions are arguably
“conservative” by recent historical standards) borders on being arbitrary.

In short, the Generational Accounts are not a useful guide for policy, because they
are based on highly unreliable forecasts (and those forecasts are unnecessarily
pessimistic), they ignore the likely path of political decisions, and they are far too easy to
manipulate. Moreover, they cannot meaningfully compare the relationships among
generations in how they share the cost of running the federal government, at least in a
way that is different from the standard crowding-out approach. While the exercise of
measuring Fiscal Gaps is based on a reasonable desire to see what we might be getting
ourselves into, the mechanisms for such long-term forecasts are simply too crude to add
meaningfully to our arsenal of policy choices.69
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Paul R. Krugman, Social Security Scares, The New York Times, Mar. 5, 2004, at A23 (“The
projected rise in Medicare expenses is mainly driven not by demography, but by the rising cost of medical
care, which in turn mainly reflects medical progress, which allows doctors to treat a wider range of
conditions.”)
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Arguably, the lesson to be drawn from an exercise like that of Gokhale and Smetters is that the
news is good, i.e., outside of the more general question of how to handle health care costs (both inside and
outside of Medicare), we do not apparently face significant long-term budget problems. If so, then the
exercise is worthwhile in a negative sense. Still, there are less favorable assumptions that could make the
Fiscal Gap calculation look worse, and those assumptions are subject to all of the uncertainties described
here. If Fiscal Gap calculations are to be but one piece of information among, therefore, they at least
should not be given the prominence that Gokhale and Smetters would give them.
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III.

Capital Budgeting
If Generational Accounts were the only available method of making decisions

about long-term fiscal policy, then it might be valuable to try to nail down some
reasonable (though still arbitrary) long-term budget projections. In fact, though, it is not
necessary to look at generational accounts at all in assessing the impacts of spending
decisions.
A. Capital Budgeting
For legal and policy analysts, the most important issue in assessing any
government policy is not the effect of the policy on the deficit (properly measured) but
rather the question of whether the policy is “worth it.” This can only be understood from
the perspective of capital budgeting.
1. Definitions
A capital budgeting system separates expenditures into two categories,
operational and capital. The operating budget accounts for the purchase of goods and
services whose full benefits are enjoyed during the year in which they are made. The
capital budget accounts for items whose benefits are longer-lasting.70 One rough estimate
of the fraction of federal spending that can be categorized as capital expenditures is
25%.71
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Many capital projects are likely to bring with them the requirement of at least a minimal level of
maintenance expenditures. Depreciation on the existing capital stock and maintenance expenditures are
thus netted out of the capital account.
71
See, for example, Neil H. Buchanan, Debt, Deficits, and Fiscal Policy Three Essays, Ph.D.
dissertation, Harvard University, 1996, and citations therein.
Page 38

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

Far from being an innovation, capital budgets are the norm virtually everywhere
but in the federal government. Publicly held corporations must separate operating and
capital expenditures, by accounting convention. Indeed, most “profitable” corporations
would not be viewed as profitable if they were prevented from segregating their capital
expenditures, since even the most profitable corporations borrow money every year (that
is, they run “deficits”).
Similarly, as noted above, state and local governments overwhelmingly use
capital budgeting. The oft-noted fact that most U.S. state governments operate under
balanced budget requirements is, indeed, not what it seems, because a state can still
borrow money for capital spending even if it does not have the tax revenue to pay for it.72
It is odd, therefore, that the federal government would not use capital budgeting.
The arguments against adopting capital budgeting are prudential, asserting that it is
simply not wise to trust Congress with such a powerful tool for justifying deficit
spending. With a capital budget available, the argument goes, any silly expenditure can
be slipped into the federal budget and camouflaged as capital spending. The entire
process, this argument continues, is open to abuse and gamesmanship.73 Indeed, former
President Clinton drew fire from the nation’s English teachers when he attempted to
describe some spending policies as investments. “[Clinton] captured third place in the
1993 Doublespeak Award, administered by the National Council of Teachers of English,
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Note that, even with a capital budget, the perversity of failing to cyclically adjust remains. If a
state is required to equate actual tax receipts with actual expenditures, balance will become deficit when the
economy goes South—and the downward spiral will continue as long as the state’s politicians are required
to balance their non-cyclically adjusted operating budget.
73
See, for example, Karen Pennar, Beware of Accounting Magic Tricks, Mr. Clinton, Business
Week, January 18, 1993, 55.
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for . . . his insistence on ‘using the word “investment” as a substitute for the word
“spending” in his rhetoric on economic policy.’”74
While it is certainly possible to over-use the word “investment,” the English
teachers simply had their accounting wrong. The choice is not between spending and
investment, but between investment spending and consumption spending. If we view
government as having to choose between the two, then our goal should not be to prevent
politicians from using the term “investment,” but rather to ensure that they use it
correctly.
2. Using Capital Accounts
While it hardly stretches the imagination to suspect that members of Congress do
not always act in accordance with pure economic theory, it is simply not true that a
capital budgeting process is an open cookie jar. Accounting standards have been
promulgated and are taught in every business school in the country. States and
corporations do, of course, sometimes play at the edges of these rules,75 but the rules can
and do constrain behavior.
Moreover, the current federal system effectively treats all expenditures as if they
were operating expenditures. While it is possible to adopt a capital budget and then to
implement it incorrectly, not to implement it literally guarantees that the government’s
budget is measured incorrectly. It also leads to poor policy choices. If the only goal is to
balance the budget, cutting projects with valuable long-term payoffs looks just as good as
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Daniel Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures and Fiscal Language. Unpublished manuscript,
January 2004, at 10-11 (citing Jan Ackerman, Forked Tongues Prevail on High; Pentagon Gets Annual
Doublespeak Award from Teachers Group, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Nov. 22, 1993, B-1).
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The reader is encouraged to provide her own joke regarding Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, etc. here.
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cutting pure pork. And it is even “desirable” to sell public assets at a loss, since any
revenue received reduces the annual deficit.
Separating investment from consumption, therefore, has at least two desirable
effects. First, it would prevent policymakers from cutting programs that are likely to
provide long-term benefits to the economy. For example, to prove their fiscal
responsibility, the leadership of the House of Representatives is intent on cutting funding
for mass transit, because they “see transportation projects as one of the first ways to cut
back the budget and reduce the deficit.”76
While it is plausible that some transportation projects would not provide longterm payoffs, others surely would. In future research, I will explore the administrative
machinery that might be put in place to allow policymakers to engage in reasonably factbased inquiries into the likely payoffs of various spending projects—without providing
room for budget mischief. For present purposes, the assertion is simply that there are
some projects that would qualify as capital spending and that it would be wise to fund
them even from borrowed funds. At the very least, it remains to be proved that the
political gamesmanship that would exist under a system of capital budgeting would
necessarily be worse for the economy than our current system.
The second advantage of adopting a capital budget for the federal government is
that it would penetrate the category commonly known as “pork-barrel” spending. The
operative definition currently seems to be that pork is anything that directly benefits a
specific legislator’s constituents. For example, Senator Robert Byrd (D., W. Va.),

76

Raymond Hernandez, Senate Panel Backs Transit Aid for New York, The New York Times,
February 25, 2004, at B7.
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probably describes himself as the “prince of pork” for his ability to direct federal projects
into his home state. Among his successes:
There are two Robert C. Byrd United States Courthouses,
four Robert C. Byrd stretches of highway, freeway,
expressway and drive, and a Robert C. Byrd Bridge. And
two Robert C. Byrd Interchanges to reach these valuable
amenities. There is the Robert C. Byrd Lifelong Learning
Center, the Robert C. Byrd Hardwood Technology Center,
the Robert C. Byrd Health and Wellness Center, and the
Robert C. Byrd Institute for Advanced Flexible
Manufacturing.77
Again, while it is possible that each of those items is actually wasteful, at least
their titles bear the earmarks of projects which state governments classify as capital
spending projects. Going beyond that superficial level to identify the valuable projects
would be an important benefit of adopting a capital budget.

B. Beyond Capital Budgeting
Clearly, this goes beyond simply arguing in favor of adopting a system of capital
budgeting. It also suggests that even balancing an operating budget is not sufficient.
Balancing the operating account, sometimes called the Golden Rule of Budgeting,78
actually allows the government to waste resources if it is able to raise the taxes to do so.
This should be unacceptable. Instead, the government’s decisions should always be
driven by considerations of whether those decisions are helpful to the current and future
health of the economy.
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Francis X. Clines. How Do West Virginians Spell Pork? It's B-Y-R-D. The New York Times, May
4, 2002, at A1.
78
Cf. Malcolm Sawyer, “On Budget Deficits and Capital Expenditures,” Working Paper, Number
208, The Jerome Levy Economics Institute, October 1997
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Dealing with Medicare is a good example. As Shaviro notes, many Medicare
expenditures are likely to improve the health of seniors. This might then plausibly reduce
the net cost of health care even as life spans lengthen. If so, then we might not wish to
cut Medicare benefits today on the basis of our concern for future generations. At the
very least, as noted above, a more careful analysis of the nature of long-term health care
trends is necessary.
C. Back to Small Decisions
An unexpected benefit of piecemeal capital budgeting is that we would not be
forced to rely on aggregate macroeconomic forecasts of the sort required by Generational
Accounting. Case-by- case analysis actually makes more sense than aggregate analysis in
this framework, because it is possible to say that a specific policy (such as funding earlychildhood nutrition programs) is likely to achieve certain goals over time (or not), based
on a much more manageable economic forecast. Being wrong about one policy need not
cause us to be wrong when estimating the effects of other policies.

IV.

What Does it Mean to Be Fair to Future Generations?
The unspoken assumption in all of this discussion, not just of capital accounting

but of generational accounting as well, is that the government should never make
decisions that would reduce economic growth in the future. Even if one completely
agrees that the measurement problems discussed above must be addressed, and that there
should be a capital budget, one is still proceeding from the assumption that the bad
decision is the one that would reduce the total capital stock that current generations
bequeath to the future.
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A. How Much is Enough?
It is possible, as noted earlier, that even a decision by the government to consume
economic resources rather than to invest them will not harm future economic prospects.
This will happen if the resources that the government purchases for its use would have
been used to produce private consumption rather than private investment. Conceptually,
if the government throws a wild party by hiring the people who would have worked at a
privately-funded wild party, then future generations are unaffected. It is only if the
government’s party is (indirectly) staffed by computer programmers and construction
workers that the future productive capacity of the economy is reduced.
This, however, still leaves open the question of why we must maximize the
capital stock that we pass on to our heirs. Given that economic growth is generally on an
upward trend, why is it necessary to give our wealthy grandchildren even greater wealth?
The bipartisan (within the economics profession as well as among politicians) silence on
this question is notable, to say the least. While there have been preliminary attempts to
estimate how much capital should be produced for future generations,79 the unspoken
assumption is quite blunt: We cannot do anything to reduce the capital stock that we
bequeath to our children and grandchildren. Perhaps it is time to question that
assumption more aggressively. (Moreover, although the subject for a different essay, it is
equally important to account for the “intergenerational unfairness” created by problems
such as environmental damage.)
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Sichel, Hassett, and Bell, … N. Gregory Mankiw, Macroeconomics, 2000.
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B. The Real Inter-Generational Issues
The very language of intergenerational transfer is, therefore, potentially
misleading. Indeed, it is not possible to “pass the bill to future generations” for our
current spending. When the government uses economic resources, the rest of the
economy currentlycannot use those resources. (This, of course, assumes that those
resources were going to be used at all. Given the prolonged slack in the global economy,
even that assumption is often contestable.) That means that we pay for what we do, in the
fundamental sense of opportunity cost.
Future generations are, of course, affected by these decisions, too. If, as discussed
earlier, the government’s decisions are likely to decrease the net capital stock that is
passed on to future generations, then their output will be lower than it would otherwise
be. Therefore, the best approach is to think about how the government is using current
resources. If it is investing them, then future generations will benefit. If it is consuming
them (or simply wasting them), then they will not.
Even more fundamentally, it is not at all obvious that cutting benefits to seniors
today will hurt only seniors. When the elderly lose benefits, they can turn to their
children to make up the difference. Even if they do not do so directly, they can consume
more of their estate than they otherwise would have, thus reducing the wealth of their
children. This incidence question indicates just how difficult it is to measure
meaningfully the impact on different generations of our fiscal policies.
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V. Conclusion
The traditional debate about budget deficits witnessed a divergence between the
economic analysis, which saw that deficits are poorly measured in the U.S. and argued
that certain deficits are beneficial for the economy, and the political view that every
deficit is evidence of moral failure. This unusual stalemate is currently on hold, as the
brief era of surpluses gave way to the (hopefully even more brief) era of terror, leading to
a decreased emphasis on fiscal orthodoxy.
In addition, an alternative approach to budgeting, Generational Accounting, has
emerged. Designed to correct some of the weaknesses of annual budgeting, GA purports
to provide an “early-warning system” to allow us to correct our long-term fiscal
imbalances before it is too late. Unfortunately, this theory is based on highly contestable
assumptions, makes questionable analytical choices, and is inherently incapable of
providing the useful baseline that its proponents promise.
Instead, a modified system of capital accounting should be used to guide
economic policy. This would emphasize case-by- case analysis, allowing legal analysts to
compare the likely costs and benefits of policy proposals while keeping a clear eye on the
importance of government investment in our future prosperity. If political concerns
about the potential abuse of capital budgeting prevent the federal government from
adopting an explicit capital budget, the best response would be to continue to rely on the
current (admittedly imperfect) budget measures, which at least provide some useful
guidance regarding the immediate effects of our fiscal policies.
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